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Introduction 
„Individual expectations about future aggregate outcomes [are] the key feature that 
distinguishes social sciences and economics from the natural sciences.” (Hommes, 2010, p. 
2.) Economics engages with individuals as actors, and with their interactions that weave into a 
system. This system is limited by the ambiguity of investor expectations: what the average 
opinion of investors is about average opinion. Classical economics dismisses the speculation 
on expectations by assuming that investment decision-making is rational. Thus, theories on 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis and the subsequent emergence of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model gained popularity. The world as we know it proved that these theories are unrealistic, 
and behavioural finance emerged as an alternative solution focusing on investors with 
bounded rationality. In order to relieve the restrictive assumptions of the CAPM, such as the 
assumption of homogeneous expectations: heterogeneous agent models of investors emerged. 
This gave rise to my research question to examine how differences of opinion of individual 
investors may be captured. Since, the opinion of investors cannot be observed directly, I 
collected sell-side analyst forecasts, a regularly published set of data and I assumed it to be a 
proxy of investors’ expectations on future market returns.  
 
If markets were as efficient as the strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests, 
then prices would already incorporate all available information. Thus, examining analyst 
opinion data would be redundant to understand equity market returns. However, my 
experience as a sell-side equity analyst gives me an oversight of the microstructure of the 
equity markets. When new information emerges, investors adjust their trades instantaneously. 
As a result, stock prices quickly reflect the new information. Analysts, on the other hand, 
would revise their fundamental models and adapt their research ideas with a lag (perhaps in a 
few days time). It is their research product that reflects a more thorough interpretation of the 
new information. The extent to which prices would fully-reflect the processed new 
information depends on the work of analysts alongside investors. The equity research industry 
inspired scientific research to examine the implications of the aggregate opinion of sell-side 
analysts. Does the dispersion of analyst opinion tell us anything about market returns? 
 
Another separate line of research seeks to understand market returns focused on the 
relationship between investment funds’ aggregate net flows and equity market returns. The 
research on this topic mostly covers developed markets. Intuitively, fund flows ought to drive 
returns and vice versa, returns ought to attract flows into the investment funds.  
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The unconnected research papers motivated me to examine how equity markets work with a 
view of the market microstructure, taking into account that analyst opinion and fund flows are 
not independent from one another. Analysts serve their investor clients, who make investment 
decisions, which are reflected in fund flow data. I became curious to understand how 
information passes from analysts to their institutional investor clients (fund managers), and 
onto the individual investors (e.g. retail clients), who induce the fund flows. Eventually, flows 
into and out of investment funds will lead to trading, that registers different opinions into 
asset prices. Therefore, examining the relationship between the three elements together, 
namely analyst forecasts, investment fund flows and asset returns, is justified. It is also a 
novice approach that I hope would help me find new results to better explain the efficiency of 
equity markets. 
 
Another interesting aspect of my research is that I examine Emerging European equity 
markets, a segment that was left untouched by the international literature on both analyst 
forecasts and fund flows. Furthermore, my empirical research covers a period of 12 years 
(from Autumn, 2000 – Spring, 2012) which is considered to extend over a complete economic 
cycle, with sub-periods spanning an economic boom in the early-mid years of the past decade, 
and the years of the recent financial crisis. It is interesting to see whether results differ in a 
pre-crisis from a post-crisis period. 
 
This dissertation will first introduce the history of equity market returns. Classical economic 
theory that presents the Efficient Market Hypothesis, its proponents and opponents is 
discussed in the first chapter. Then, in chapter 2, I introduce the market microstructure: how 
markets work. Investors, analysts and brokerage firms are interrelated, and the professional 
relationship reveals that analysts on the sell-side give their opinion in the form of investment 
recommendations and target prices on assets they cover. Inventors are the recipients of the 
research, and also, they are the investment decision-makers. In chapter 3, I present the 
measurement of analyst opinion, and the methodology of aggregating analyst opinion to cover 
countries (rather than single stocks) to make them comparable with country-related fund flow 
data. In chapter 4, I present the literature on the relationship between analyst forecasts and 
returns. The papers are presented chronologically. This is followed by chapter 5, where I 
present the literature on the relationship between investment fund flows and market returns. 
This area of research is covered only by a handful of papers. In chapter 6, I outline my 
empirical work, introducing the datasets at hand, my hypotheses, the methodology and the 
results of my empirical examinations. 
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The relationship between analyst opinion and market returns: 
A wide range of published papers tackle the issue of heterogeneous beliefs in the context of 
asset pricing. Most papers focus on whether the differences in analyst opinion have a 
significant effect on future stock returns. 
Literature on negative relationship 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) (henceforth DMS) and Johnson (2004) report a 
negative relationship between the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and future returns, 
and show that dispersion in earnings forecasts is not suitable as a proxy for risk. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) and Hong and Stein (1999) found no significant relationship between the 
two, and several other researchers like Malkiel (1982), Barry and Brown (1985) accounted for 
a positive correlation and consider dispersion as a possible proxy for risk. In response to the 
contradicting evidence, Qu et al. (2004) argued that the mixed results were due to the wrong 
definition of the risk measure. They said that it is the variability in dispersion and not the level 
of dispersion per se that is important. They show that the variability of analysts' earnings 
forecasts – being a systematic pricing factor – is a good proxy for risk.  
Literature on positive relationship 
Several papers document that dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts is positively correlated 
with future returns and also with risk measures such as the market beta. Malkiel (1982) argues 
that dispersion is actually a better proxy for risk than the traditional market beta, because he 
accounts for a higher correlation coefficient between dispersion and expected future returns, 
than between the beta and expected returns. This result contradicts the findings of DMS. This 
may be attributed to the methodology applied. The expected future returns are derived using 
the dividend discount model, while DMS and Johnson (2004) used ex-poste returns. Malkiel 
(1982) estimated his model during 1960s and there is evidence (Bodie et al., 2003, p. 403.) 
that in the 1950-1999 time period the two valuations differ substantially, indicating that their 
results are data specific.  
Barry and Brown (1985) built a theoretical model of differential information, which predicts a 
positive relationship between the divergence of analyst opinions and excess returns. They 
argue that the increase of the relevant available information has two consequences at the same 
time. On the one hand it reduces the divergence of analysts' opinion, and on the other hand it 
reduces the estimation risk. Lower estimation risk means lower risk, and according to the 
basic risk-return trade-off it implies lower subsequent expected excess returns. In this way 
divergence of opinions can be used as a proxy for systematic risk. The main set-back to their 
model is that it lacks empirical evidence, it remains only a hypothesis. 
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The Relationship between Fund flows and Market Returns 
In recent years, several academic papers studied investment fund flows and their effect on 
prices and yields as investment funds might contribute to the stabilization or destabilization of 
the financial markets (Bengtsson, 2009). Furthermore, money in- and outflows to investment 
funds may have an impact on equity returns as it was shown by Fridson (2000), on 
commodity prices like gold prices (Warther, 1995) and on stock prices as well (Warther, 
1995; Fortune 1998).  Moreover, since it might influence the stock prices it might have an 
effect on stock market returns, as shown by Warther (1995) and Goetzmann and Massa 
(1999). 
Applied Methodology 
The database collected for the empirical research of my dissertation is truly unique. The 
source of the data on analysts’ forecasts was Bloomberg. The database includes 7 countries 
that are part of the EMEA region, which is an abbreviation for Europe, Middle East and 
Africa. My focus area within EMEA region is on Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, Russia and Turkey, which I will collectively refer to as Emerging Europe. 
 
I proceeded on to grouping data in order to obtain a weekly time-series of forecast mean, and 
dispersion. I introduce the following notation system. 
s – stock where s (1….S) S is the total number of stocks within a country. 
a – analyst where a (1….A) A is the total number of analyst in our database. 
t – time where t (1…..T) 
R – recommendation R (1,2,3,4,5) 
a,t,sR is the latest recommendation given for stock s valid on week t by analyst a. 
Average of recommendations of a given stock on a given week. 
t,s
A
1a
a,t,s
R
A
R


  
1. Equation 
Dispersion is measured by the standard deviation of recommendations of a given stock on a 
given week. 
t,s
a
2
t,sa,t,s
A
)RR(


 
2. Equation 
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If an analyst doesn’t publish a new recommendation on a given week, I consider the latest 
recommendation published to be valid up to 3 months time. If no update is given within the 
next 3 months, I consider the recommendation out of date and exclude it. 
The database contained several recommendations by the same analyst for the same stock 
during the same week. In such cases, I considered the most recent recommendation.  
To create country recommendations, I aggregated individual stock recommendations 
weighting them with their respective weights in the country’s main stock index. Index weights 
are tracked for each month. 
t,sw is the weight of the stock in the country index on week t. 
I proceed to calculate the average and standard deviation of the country recommendations. 
Average recommendation for a given country on a given week: 
t
S
1s
t,st,s RwR 

 
3. Equation 
Standard deviation of recommendations for a given country on a given week: 
t
S
s
tsts w  
1
,,  
4. Equation 
Now, I have established weekly time series of average opinion represented by the average 
recommendations, and the heterogeneity of expectations proxied by the standard deviation of 
recommendation for each of the seven countries of the Emerging European region. 
Data on Investment Fund Flows 
The source of fund flow data is the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) database that 
gathers information from investment funds on their flows globally. It publishes fund flow 
reports on a daily, weekly and monthly basis and the data are available to subscribers for a 
fee. 
The fund flow data gathered during my research work are for the same seven countries 
included in the analyst forecast database, namely Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Russia and Turkey – collectively called Emerging Europe. The data covers weekly 
fund flows for equity investment from 27
th
 October, 2000 to 10
th
 August, 2011 that makes up 
a time-series of 564 observations for each country. Also, I have data for assets under 
management (AUM) for each week. 
The comparison of flow data across countries faces two problems. One is that the countries 
differ in the magnitude of assets and the volume of the flows. Another problem is that 
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compilation of data by EPFR expanded as years passed by, and currently the dataset covers 
more funds than at initiation. Therefore, for analysis purposes, I will compute flows in relative 
terms as a percentage of total assets under management. This will normalise the data to allow 
for comparisons of countries that have different flow sizes and will also handle the problem of 
the extension of coverage through time.  
Also, as the data are denominated in USD, changes in flows will reflect not only investor 
behaviour, but also the effects of foreign exchange rate fluctuations. 
My database includes all funds and country-dedicated funds. All funds include full coverage 
of EPFR funds and take the pro-rata share of a fund’s investments into a country, based on the 
disclosure of the fund manager. Country-dedicated funds are a sub-set of the all funds data. 
They include flow from funds only dedicated to investing to a particular country. For analysis 
purposes, I will use the all funds data to capture the more extended set of fund data. 
Results of Empirical Tests 
In this chapter, I present my hypotheses and the results of the empirical tests I conducted with 
the aim of identifying possible relationships and causality between analyst opinion, fund 
flows and market returns. As shown in figure 1, a relationship may exist between any of the 
three variables. 
My proposition is that the functioning and compensation of the equity research industry 
indicates that the market does reimburse their efforts, subsequently assigns an economical 
value to their information-processing work. From this stems my assumption that market 
efficiency in its strongest form does not hold in practice and that the semi-strong form would 
not hold without the existence of equity research. 
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Figure 1: The inter-relations between analyst forecasts, investment fund flows and market returns. Source: 
author. 
H1: A relationship exists between index returns and average analyst opinion 
(recommendation and target prices). 
Average target price for BET (1,2,5 lags), BUX (1,2 lags), ISE (3-8 lags) and Micex (1-4 
lags) indices Granger-caused USD-based returns negatively. 
This means that higher target prices for Romanian, Hungarian, Turkish and Russian stocks 1-
3 weeks earlier led to lower dollar returns. 
Average recommendations for ATX (1 lag) Granger-caused local currency and dollar-based 
returns negatively.  Conversely, average recommendations for BET (2,5,6,7,8 lags) and BUX 
(2 lags) Granger-caused local currency returns positively. 
This means that average recommendations gave mixed results regarding the direction of the 
relationship, with significant causality for the Austrian (1 lag), Romanian (2,5,6,7,8 lags) and 
Hungarian (2 lags) indices. 
One might infer that target prices prove to be a more consistent indicator to analyst opinion, 
and have a more straightforward effect on average returns, albeit in a negative direction, 
whereas past recommendations provide ambiguous signals in predicting weekly returns. 
Analyst 
opinion 
Market 
returns 
Fund flows 
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Recommendations 
BUX(AVR)1-8    
MICEX(AVR)4,5,6,7   
PX(AVR)1-8    
 
Target prices 
 
ATX(AVR)7    
BET(AVR)2-8    
BUX(AVR)7,8    
MICEX(AVR)1   
Recommendations 
BUX(AVR)8    
 
Target prices 
 
BET(AVR)1-7    
BUX(AVR)1    
MICEX(AVR)1   
 
Recommendations 
BET(LC/AVR)1,2    
BUX(LC/AVR)2-8    
PX(LC/AVR)1-8 
WIG(LC/AVR)5-8    
 
BET(USD/AVR)2    
BUX(USD/AVR)2-8    
PX(USD/AVR)2,7 
 
Target prices 
 
ATX(LC/AVR)2,4,5,7,8    
BET(LC/AVR)2-6    
 
ATX(USD/AVR)2,5,7,8    
BET(USD/AVR)2-8 
 
Recommendations 
ATX(LC/AVR)1    
BET(LC/AVR)2,5,6,7,8    
BUX(LC/AVR)2    
 
ATX(USD/AVR)1    
BET(USD/AVR)2,5,6,7,8    
 
Target prices 
 
BET(USD/AVR)1,2,5 
BUX(USD/AVR)1,2 
ISE(USD/AVR)3-8 
MICEX(USD/AVR)1-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Full period Granger-causality for given markets with specified lags. Numbers in red indicate a 
negative relationship; the others indicate a positive relationship. 
 
To further explore this effect, I repeated the same test on two parts of the data, the first 
covered the period from 25th September, 2006 to 14th September, 2008, a period of economic 
boom, when stock markets saw an upward trend. This period I called the pre-crisis period. 
The second, the post-crisis period covers the period from 14th September, 2008 to 8th August, 
2011. 15th September, 2008 was the day chosen to divide the data into pre- and post-crisis is 
the memorable day when Lehman Brothers announced filing for bankruptcy; its share price 
fell 90% on that trading day. 
In the pre-crisis period, average target prices for ATX (1 lag), BUX (1,2,6 lags) and ISE (2-8 
lags) Granger-caused local currency returns negatively. Average target price for ISE (1,2,7,8 
lags) Granger-caused USD-based returns negatively.  
Recommendations proved less effective in explaining index returns in the pre-crisis period.  
The impact of recommendations was less apparent in the post-crisis period, but corroborated 
previous results with two examples of causation. Average recommendation for ATX (1,2 
lags) and BET (2,3 lags) Granger-caused local currency returns negatively; furthermore ATX 
(1 lag) and BET (2,3 lags) Granger-caused USD-based returns negatively. 
Fund flows Index returns 
BET(LC)2  BUX(LC)2,4,7  PX(LC)2,3,4,7  
WIG(LC)2,7 
 
BET(USD)2  ISE(USD)2  PX(USD)2,7  
WIG(USD)2,7 
 
ATX (LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  BET(LC)1-8  BUX(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  ISE(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8    
MICEX(LS) 1-8  PX(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8    WIG(LC)1-8 
 
ATX (USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  BET(USD) 1-8  BUX(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  ISE(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  
MICEX(USD) 1-8  PX(USD) 1-8  WIG(USD) 1-8 
Average analyst opinion 
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Recommendations 
BET(AVR)1-8 
BUX(AVR) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
MICEX(AVR) 6,8   
PX(AVR)7 
 
Target prices 
 
BET(AVR)1    
BUX(AVR)5,6,7,8    
 
 
Recommendations 
BUX(AVR)4    
 
Target prices 
 
BET(AVR)1-7    
BUX(AVR)1    
WIG(AVR) 2 
 
Recommendations 
BET(LC/AVR)1-5    
 
BET(USD/AVR)2    
WIG(USD / AVR)5 
 
Target prices 
 
BUX(LC/AVR)7,8 
 
BUX(USD/AVR)7,8 
 
Recommendations 
BET(LC/AVR) 7,8    
 
BET(USD/AVR)7  
 
Target prices 
 
ATX(LC/AVR)1 
BUX(LC/AVR)1,2,6    
ISE(LC/AVR) 2-8 
 
ISE(USD/AVR) 1,2,7,8 
 
Recommendations 
BET(AVR)1,2 
BUX(AVR)2-8    
MICEX(AVR) 1,2,4,5   
PX(AVR)1-7 
WIG(AVR) 1-4 
 
Target prices 
 
ATX(AVR) 6,7,8 
BET(AVR)1,2,6,7,8 
 
 
Recommendations 
MICEX(AVR) 1   
 
Target prices 
 
BET(AVR)1,3 
ISE(AVR) 3 
MICEX(AVR) 1,2 
 
Recommendations 
BET(LC/AVR)2 
BUX(LC/AVR)2-8    
PX(LC/AVR)2-8 
WIG(LC / AVR)5-8 
 
BET(USD/AVR)2    
BUX(USD/AVR)2-8 
PX(USD/AVR)2-8 
WIG(USD/AVR)5,7,8 
 
Target prices 
 
ATX(LC/AVR)1-5,7 
BET(LC/AVR)2 
 
ATX(USD/AVR)1,2 
BET(USD/AVR)2,3,4 
 
 
Recommendations 
ATX(LC/AVR) 1,2    
BET(LC/AVR)2,3 
ATX(USD/AVR) 1 
BET(USD/AVR)2,3 
 
Target prices 
ATX(LC/AVR)2,7,8 
BET(LC/AVR)1,2,3,5,6 
BUX(LC/AVR)1,2,4,5    
ISE(LC/AVR) 3-8 
MICEX(LC/AVR)1,2,3,4,5,7 
ATX(USD/AVR)2 
BET(USD/AVR)1,2,3 
BUX(USD/AVR)1,2,3,4,5 
ISE(USD/AVR) 3,4,5,6,7,8 
MICEX(USD/AVR)1,2,3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Pre-crisis period Granger-causality for given markets with specified lags. Numbers in red indicate a 
negative relationship; the others indicate a positive relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Post-crisis period Granger-causality for given markets with specified lags. Numbers in red indicate a 
negative relationship; the others indicate a positive relationship. 
Average analyst opinion 
Fund flows Index returns 
BET(PX(LC)1,2,3  ISE(LC) 8   WIG(LC)1,2,3,8 
 
PX(USD)1-5  WIG(USD)1-5 
 
BET(USD)2  ISE(USD)2  PX(USD)2,7  
WIG(USD)2,7 
 
ATX (LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  BET(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  BUX(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  ISE(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  
MICEX(LS) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  PX(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8    WIG(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8   
 
ATX (USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6 BET(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  BUX(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  ISE(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  
MICEX(USA) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  PX(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  WIG(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8   
 
 
Average analyst opinion 
Fund flows Index returns 
ATX (LC) 4,5,6,7  BET(LC) 2   BUX(LC)2,3,4,5,6,7  
ISE(LC) 2  MICEX(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  
PX(LC)2,3,4,6,7,8  WIG(LC)2,6,7,8 
 
ATX (USD) 4,5,6,7,8  BET(USD) 2 
BUX(USD)2,6,7  ISE(USD) 2 MICEX(USD)7,8   
PX(USD) 2,3,6,7,8 WIG(USD)2,7,8 
 
BET(USD)2  ISE(USD)2  PX(USD)2,7  
WIG(USD)2,7 
 
ATX (LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  BET(LC)1-8        BUX(LC)1-8  ISE(LC) 1-8  MICEX(LC) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  
PX(LC)1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  WIG(LC)1-8 
 
ATX (USD) 1,2,4,5,6,7,8  BET(USD) 1-8       BUX(USD)1-8    ISE(USD) 1-8    MICEX(USD) 
1-8  PX(USD) 1-8  WIG(USD) 1-8 
 
 
  14 
Results from splitting the time-series into bull (pre-crisis) and bear (post-crisis) markets 
supported the findings from the examination of the full period, namely, that average target 
prices cause weekly returns negatively.  
The causal relationship in the opposite direction was also tested to get proof whether index 
returns caused analyst opinion. Examining the full period, average target prices for ATX 
(2,4,5,7 lags) and BET (2-6 lags) Granger-caused local currency returns negatively. Also, 
ATX (2,5 lags) and BET (2-8 lags) Grangers-caused USD-returns negatively. 
For the same period, average recommendations showed mixed results. BET (1 lag), BUX (2-8 
lags) and PX (5-8 lags) Granger-caused local currency returns negatively. Also, average 
recommendations for BET (2 lags) and BUX (2-8 lags) Granger-caused USD-based returns 
negatively. On the other hand, BET (2 lags) and WIG (5-8 lags) Granger-caused local 
currency returns positively. Also, average recommendations for PX (2 lags) Granger-caused 
USD-based returns positively. 
Pre-crisis average target prices barely showed any effect, only BUX (7, 8 lags) Granger-
caused both local currency and USD-based returns negatively. 
Average recommendations in the bull market showed similarly rare instances of causality. 
Average recommendation for BET (1-5 lags) Granger-caused local currency returns 
negatively, and average recommendations for BET (2 lags) Granger-caused USD-based 
returns negatively.  The WIG (5 lags) showed a positive relationship, on the other hand. 
In the bear market, average target prices for ATX (1-5 lags) and BET (2 lags) Granger-caused 
local currency returns negatively, and ATX (1, 2 lags) and BET (2, 3, 4 lags) Granger-caused 
USD-based returns negatively.  
Results from the causality tests between analyst opinion and index returns generally shows a 
negative relationship – especially in the post-crisis period – target prices appear to give the 
message to trade the opposite of what analyst recommend. A possible explanation could be 
that analysts appear to be late in publishing their opinion, or another explanation could be that 
the market does not react to their opinion in the first 8 weeks following publication; after all, 
analysts publish 12 month target prices and recommendations. 
H2: A relationship exists between the dispersion of analyst opinion (target prices and 
recommendations) and market returns. 
Dispersion is captured by relative standard deviation of all valid target prices and 
recommendations issued for a given stock during a given week. Weekly market returns are 
calculated for each stock individually in both local currency and USD as in the previous 
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Recommendations 
MICEX2,5,6,7,8   
PX3 
 
Target prices 
BET1-8    
MICEX3-6 
 
Recommendations 
MICEX2-8 
 
Target prices 
BUX1 
 
 
Recommendations 
None 
 
Target prices 
ATX(LC)3-5 
BET(LC) 2-8 
MICEX(LC)2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
ATX(USD)3-8 
BET(USD)3-8 
MICEX(USD)1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
 
Recommendations 
BUX(LC)1 
WIG(LC)2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
WIG(USD)2,3,4,5 
 
Target prices 
ISE(LC) 1,2 
MICEX(LC)2,3,4,5,6,7 
ISE(USD) 1-5,7 
MICEX(USD)2,3,4 
examinations. To test whether a causal relationship exists, and to determine its direction, I 
will use the Granger causality test between the two time-series for each stock. 
Dispersion of target prices for the full period for ISE (1,2 lags) and Micex (2,7 lags) 
negatively Granger-cause local currency return, and ISE (1-5,7 lags) and Micex (2, 4 lags) 
negatively Granger-cause USD-based returns. This is in line with evidence reported in the 
literature showing a negative relationship between dispersion and returns, indicating that 
higher dispersion is a proxy for risk, and therefore result in lower returns. Uncertainty is a 
different concept from risk. Bélyácz (2010) summarises and explains the literature that 
defines risk as having known or estimated probabilities, whereas uncertainty considers both 
the outcomes and their probabilities as unknown. Investors require compensation for holding 
stocks that entail high uncertainty, as measured by the high dispersion in analyst forecasts. 
The opinion of analysts that show in one direction, or have a low dispersion means that 
analysts are more certain regarding the future prospects of the stock.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Full period Granger-causality for given markets with specified lags. Numbers in red indicate a 
negative relationship; the others indicate a positive relationship. 
 
The results are only true in the case of two markets, the Turkish and the Russian, and the 
latter showed mixed results. The outlier result is the positive causal relationship from Micex 
(3-6 lags) for local currency returns. 
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ATX (USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  BET(USD) 1-8  BUX(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  ISE(USD) 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8  
MICEX(USD) 1-8  PX(USD) 1-8  WIG(USD) 1-8 
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Recommendations 
ATX 2,3,45,6,7,8 
BET3-6    
 
Target prices 
 
Recommendations 
ISE 2,3,4,5 
WIG2 
 
Target prices 
 
BUX1 
 
 
Recommendations 
ATX(LC) 8 
MICEX(LC)6,7,8 
ATX(USD) 8 
MICEX(USD)6,7,8 
 
Target prices 
 
 
Recommendations 
PX(LC) 1 
WIG(LC) 1,2,3,4,5 
PX(USD) 1 
WIG(USD) 1,2,3,4,5 
 
Target prices 
 
ATX(USD) 1-3 
ISE(USD) 1 
MICEX(USD)3 
 
 
Looking at the pre-crisis period, the dispersion of target prices for ATX (1-3 lags), ISE (1 lag) 
and Micex (3 lags) Granger-caused USD-based returns negatively; in line with the literature 
results. The post-crisis period showed that dispersion of target prices for ATX (7,8 lags) 
positively Granger-caused local currency and USD-based returns, whereas ISE (1-3 lags) 
negatively caused USD-based returns. 
Dispersion of recommendations showed the opposite results. For the full period, BUX (1 lag) 
and WIG (2-6 lags) positively caused local currency returns, with the exception of WIG (7,8 
lags) where the causal relationship was positive. The pre-crisis period confirmed the positive 
causal relationship for PX (1 lag) and WIG (2-5 lags) for local currency returns and for PX (1 
lag) and WIG (1-5 lags) impacting USD-based returns. A minor outlier was WIG (1 lag) with 
a negative relationship with local currency returns. The post crisis period also gave proof of 
positive causation for BUX (1-4 lags) and WIG (3-5 lags) for local currency returns. Outlier 
considering the direction of the relationship was PX (2 lag) that showed a significant negative 
relationship with local currency returns. 
These results, although mostly show positive direction of causality, are mixed and would be 
insufficient to draw conclusions, but the difference in the direction of the impact 
recommendation and target price dispersion has on returns is noteworthy. As if, one is a 
strong signal to investors, whereas the other is being published under pressure to please. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Pre-crisis period Granger-causality for given markets with specified lags. Numbers in red indicate a 
negative relationship; the others indicate a positive relationship. 
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Figure 7: Post-crisis period Granger-causality for given markets with specified lags. Numbers in red indicate a 
negative relationship; the others indicate a positive relationship. 
 
No effect was observed for the pre-crisis period. The post-crisis period showed that local 
currency returns Granger-caused ATX (2-8 lags) and BET (3-8 lags) negatively, as expected. 
Also, USD-based returns Granger-caused ATX (3-8 lags) and Micex (2 lags) negatively. 
The other part of my research refers to investment fund flow data. The compilation, 
publication of the data, its reporting and monitoring by investors implies that investment fund 
flow data carry economic value that is not yet fully understood by the market. To unveil the 
effects of this data, I examined its relationship with market returns. 
H3: A relationship exists between investment fund flows and market returns. 
Flow data were arranged on a weekly basis, published to include data from every week’s 
Thursday to the following week’s Wednesday. The weekly stock returns were constructed 
accordingly to cover a Thursday-Wednesday period. The reason I had arranged analyst 
forecast data in the same weekly format in which fund flows are reported is to allow for 
testing the two datasets against one another. Fund flows (FF) are taken as a percentage of 
assets under management (AUM) of the funds covered and hereinafter referred to commonly 
as the funds, whereby I refer to (FF/AUM). 
Fund flows Index returns 
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The hypothesis is that a positive relationship exists between index returns and FF/AUM, and 
the causal relationship can be in both directions. The results support the hypothesis. 
For the full period tested, funds Granger-caused local currency and USD-based returns for 
BET (2 lags), BUX (2,4,7 lags), PX (2,4,7 lags) and WIG (2,7 lags) positively.  
The surprising results comes from the pre-crisis period, funds negatively cause returns. In the 
case of PX (1,2,3 lags) and WIG (1,2,3,8 lags) a negative Granger-causality was recorded for 
local currency returns. Also, PX (1-5 lags) and WIG (1-5 lags) also negatively Granger-
caused USD-based returns. The post-crisis period showed mixed results. ATX (4,7 lags), BET 
(2 lags), BUX (2,4,7 lags), ISE (2 lags), Micex (2,5,7 lags), PX (2-7 lags) and WIG (2,7,8 
lags) showed positive relationships with local currency returns, whereas ATX (5,6 lags), BUX 
(3,5,6 lags, Micex (1,3,4,6,8 lags), PX (8 lags) and WIG (6 lags) showed negative 
relationships with local currency returns. A similarly mixed result was arrived at for USD-
based returns. 
These results could be interpreted that funds impacted returns during and after the crisis, and 
had inconsistent mixed effects in the earlier stage, perhaps owing to the fact that data 
collected from the funds did not cover a considerable proportion of the trading volume on 
CEE equities. However, post-crisis results show that fund data could be valuable for those 
who trade based on observing the positive causality of funds on index returns. 
The second part of the question is how do index returns help understand funds. The 
assumption again is that the relationship is positive. For the full period, local currency and 
USD-based returns significantly Granger-cause funds positively for ATX (1-6,8 lags), BET 
(1-8 lags), BUX (1-6,8 lags), ISE (1-5,8 lags), Micex (1-8 lags), PX (1-5,7,8 lags) and WIG 
(1-8 lags). Results are fully in line with our expectation. Higher returns induce higher fund 
flows. Pre-crisis period shows this positive causal relationship for all indices for 1-3 lags. 
Some alternate relationship directions are shown for later lags, but this does not affect our 
conclusion, that positive (negative) returns for the past 1-3 weeks cause higher (lower) fund 
flows. The post-crisis period also corroborates this result and conclusion, and shows a strong 
causal relationship for all indices covering all lags. Slight outlying results (visible in the 
graph) do not impact the overall conclusion. 
H4: A relationship exists between average analyst opinion (target prices and 
recommendations) and investment fund flows. 
Average target prices for BET (1-7 lags), BUX (1 lag) and Micex (1 lag) Granger-cause funds 
negatively for the full period. 
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In the pre-crisis period, BET (1-7 lags) and BUX (1 lag) indices show a negative causal 
relationship (expect WIG (2 lags) shows a positive relationship). Post-crisis, BET (1,3 lags) 
and Micex (1,2 lags) support the negative relationships established for the previous periods.  
Average recommendations have a less apparent impact. For the full period, only BUX (8 lags) 
shows any significant causal relationship with funds, and that is a negative relationship. 
During the pre-crisis period, BUX (4 lags) shows a positive relationship, and the post-crisis 
period brings Micex (1 lag) to cause funds in a negative directions. These results are weak and 
do not help in explaining how funds react to analyst opinion. 
The other direction of causality was tested with more apparent results. Funds Granger-caused 
average analyst opinion (target prices and recommendations). For the full period examined, 
ATX (7 lags), BET (2-8 lags), BUX (7,8 lags) and Micex (1 lag) proved to be significant 
causality contributors in a negative direction. 
Pre-crisis BET (1 lag) and BUX (5,6,7 lags) and post crisis ATX (8 lags) and BET (1,2,6,7,8 
lags) where examples of funds negatively causing analyst average target prices. 
As for recommendations, funds for the full period showed that BUX (1-8 lags), Micex (4-7 
lags) and PX (1-8 lags) negatively cause average recommendations. This was corroborated by 
results from BET (1-8 lags), BUX (1,2,3,6,7,8 lags) and Micex (6,8 lags) for the pre-crisis 
period. Also, funds significantly Granger-caused average analyst recommendations for BUX 
(2-8 lags), Micex (1,2,4,5 lags), PX (1-7 lags) and WIG (1-4 lags) for the post crisis period. 
H5: A relationship exists between the dispersion in analyst opinion (target prices and 
recommendations) and investment fund flows. 
The dispersion in analyst target prices for the fully period included only BUX (1 lag) to 
positively Granger-cause funds.  In the pre-crisis period, BUX (1 lag) had a negative effect, 
and in the post-crisis period, BUX (1 lag) and PX (3,4 lags) Granger-caused funds positively, 
whereas Micex (2,3,4 lags) Granger-caused funds negatively. These mixed results shows that 
no causal effect could be spotted on the data examined.  
The dispersion in analyst recommendations positively caused funds. For the full period, 
Micex (2-8 lags) showed significant Granger-causality, in the pre-crisis period ISE (2,3 lags) 
and WIG (2 lags) supported the same positive causal relationship. An odd results was ISE (4,5 
lags) showing a negative relationship. In the post-crisis period, Micex (2-6 lags) also 
positively Granger-caused funds.  
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The results are somewhat contradictory (odds exist) and results apply only to one or two 
indices, none the less, it is interesting to look to the explanation of a positive relationship; 
why does higher dispersion in recommendations cause more fund inflow. Either investors are 
risk-lovers and buy on ambiguity; or do not interpret dispersion of opinion as a proxy of risk. 
Another possible explanation could be that high dispersion reflects contrarian opinion which 
is a strategy investors in the Russian, Turkish and Polish markets may have followed. 
Examining whether funds impact the dispersion of analyst opinion, I find that the relationship 
is negative when looking at the full period. Funds negatively Granger-caused dispersion of 
target prices for BET (1-8 lags) and Micex (3-6 lags). No significant causality was uncovered 
in the bull market of the pre-crisis period, but the bear market in the post-crisis period showed 
mixed results. For BUX (3,5,6,7 lags) and Micex (3,4,5,6 lags) a negative causal relationship 
was shown, whereas ATX (1,3,4 lags), BET (1-8 lags) and BUX (4 lags) showed a positive 
causal relationship. 
Funds negatively Granger-caused dispersion of analyst recommendations for Micex (2,5,6,7,8 
lags) and PX (3 lags) for the full period; ATX (2,7,8 lags) and BET (3-6 lags) for the pre-
crisis period; and ISE (8 lags) and Micex (2 lags) for the post-crisis period.  
Summary 
In this dissertation I investigated equity market efficiency in Emerging Europe through the 
relationship between sell-side equity analyst forecasts, fund flow data and market returns. The 
financial literature has examined the effect of both analyst forecasts and fund flows 
separately, in order to better understand what impacts market returns. No literature, to my 
knowledge, captured the equity market microstructure (analyst forecasts, market returns, and 
fund flows) in one framework. This enables me to examine whether the causal relationships 
between the two factors and returns could also be derived from the third relationship: namely, 
between analyst forecasts and fund flows. The argument in support of my approach is that the 
product of analysts’ work serves clients at investment funds; therefore I assume that empirical 
tests would prove a causal relationship between what analysts say and what investment fund 
managers act upon. The counter argument could be the time mismatch in the investment 
horizons: analyst forecast offers a 12 month view, whereas investment funds make both 
shorter term (daily and weekly) investment decisions in addition to the mid-term and long-
term ones (monthly and annual).  
According to Fama (1970) markets are efficient to the extent that new information is reflected 
in asset prices. How does new information get priced-in? The equity market micro-structure 
reveals that analysts analyse new information and present their research to investors, who in 
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turn may act upon the new information. In an efficient market, where the efficient market 
hypothesis holds in its stronger form, analyst forecasts would have an immediate effect on 
fund flows, that in turn have an immediate effect on market returns; both effects taking place 
instantaneously, and no further impact should be observed.  
The empirical results of my dissertation contradicts the efficient market hypothesis, since in 
many cases market returns significantly over- and under-reacted to analyst forecasts. This can 
be explained in different ways. Firstly, I am examining emerging markets, therefore 
temporary inefficiencies can be considered as normal. Secondly, as information is priced in 
slowly, I observed two-directional relationships which indicate that it is difficult to determine 
whether analyst forecasts or fund flows drive equity returns or vice versa. 
The database used in my empirical research covers the equity market of 7 emerging European 
countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Turkey) from 1st 
January 2000 – 25th March 2012. This period spans the economic crisis of 2008; therefore I 
refer to the period before Lehman Brothers’ collapse on 15th September 2008 as the pre-crisis 
period, and consequently the latter period is called as post-crisis period.  
The fund flow data is the proprietary data of EPFR that publishes weekly data on each Friday 
covering the previous week’s net amount of money flows into a country’s equity market, 
covering both country dedicated funds as well as all funds allocated to that country. EPFR 
data are quite expensive, and it is only available to paying clients.  
The data on analyst forecast are unique and original since I compiled all items one by one 
from Bloomberg’s database covering 437 stocks, and 55 sell-side equity analyst target prices 
and recommendations (jointly referred to as analyst forecast), a total of 22,568 entries. 
Weekly average and dispersion of target prices and recommendations were set up for each 
country, with 631 weeks examined.  
The datasets on fund flows, analyst forecast and market returns are all aligned in weekly 
format to enable time-series analysis. 
My findings can be summarised in three points: 
1. Fund flows  
In general, fund flows and market returns have a positive two-directional relationship. This is 
in line with my initial expectations, which is also supported by empirical literature including 
Fortune (1998), Goetzmann and Massa (1999), Ippolito (1992) and Alexakis et al. (2004). 
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Positive fund flow means liquidity influx to the market that will hike asset prices, and hence 
returns. Conversely, higher returns attract money into funds, through cross-asset reallocations. 
My findings show that fund flows Granger cause market returns for the subsequent 2 weeks. 
However, this was evident only in 4 countries and the results vary during the pre- and post-
crisis period. Before the crisis, the relationship is rather negative, and post-crisis I record 
rather positive relationships. Therefore, the direction of the relationship is uncertain and fairly 
unstable in time. Hence, during some periods, fund flows may help in forecasting market 
returns, nevertheless, a profitable trading strategy can hardly be based solely upon this 
dataset. 
At the same time, the reverse effect of market returns on fund flows is much stronger, covers 
longer lags and was proved in the example of most countries. The positive relationship is 
more apparent in the post-crisis period. One possible explanation could be that before the 
crisis, the database comprised much less funds than in the later periods and EPFR’s database 
coverage of funds expanded continuously. 
2. Average analyst forecasts 
I observed a negative relationship between average analyst target prices and subsequent 
returns. High average target prices Granger-caused lower returns after 1-3 weeks. The same 
results were seen when the Granger-causality test was repeated for the pre- and the post-crisis 
periods separately, with the most apparent results for the post-crisis period. This surprising 
result signals that during this period, analysts were not successful in forecasting equity 
returns. A possible explanation could be that higher target prices attract sellers to the market 
who see an opportunity to realise gains. Or high target prices in the Emerging European 
equity research arena could have been a signal for a contrarian trading strategy. 
For recommendations, the relationship is also negative, but results are less robust than in the 
case of target prices. 
When examining the relationship between average analyst forecasts and fund flows, I also 
arrive at surprising results. Namely, average analyst forecasts negatively Granger caused 
subsequent fund flows. There is no literature on this relationship, but my initial assumption 
was that analyst forecasts Granger cause fund flows in a positive direction. A possible 
explanation to the negative relationship can be an immediate over-reaction to analyst forecasts 
and slow corrections in the following 1-2 weeks. The reverse relationship, whether fund flows 
affect analyst forecasts were not significant on this sample.  
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3. Dispersion of analyst forecasts 
The dispersion of analyst target prices and market returns show a negative relationship in both 
directions. My results contradict Malkiel (1982), and Barry and Brown (1985) and therefore, I 
cannot consider dispersion as a possible proxy for risk, as they have suggested. On the other 
hand, my results were inline and support the findings of the mainstream literature such as 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Johnson (2004). However, the results are unstable 
across countries and through time, especially following the crisis. The explanation provided 
by literature (see McNichols and O'Brien (1997) Denis and Dimitri (2002), and (Chen et al., 
2001)), could also be considered for my data. First reason is the costly short selling in 
Emerging Markets, and later on, complete short selling ban during the post-crisis period. 
Another reason is that prices suffered upward bias more, as negative information was 
withheld from the market, coupled with low market breadth.  
The empirical tests confirmed the negative direction causal relationship for target prices, but 
found a positive causality for recommendations. The same results were confirmed for the pre-
crisis period. However, the crisis period failed to show any meaningful direction for causality 
as results were mixed, which means that dispersion of forecasts was misleading during the 
crisis.  
The relationship between the dispersion of analyst target prices and fund flows is less 
pronounced, but shows a negative relationship in the subsequent 1-2 weeks. My presumptions 
were not reflected in my results. I assume that the information transmission mechanism 
between analyst forecast and fund flow data is subtle, and therefore the tests failed to capture 
it. 
I summarise the results of the empirical tests in figure 8. In the first column, the hypotheses 
state a causal relationship and its direction between any two variables. The second column 
indicates whether analyst forecast is captured by target price (TP) or recommendation (Rec.). 
The last three columns show whether the relationship was positive or negative, and for how 
many subsequent weeks (lags) was the relationship significant. Results are shown when the 
relationship is not mixed and holds for at least 2 countries. 
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  Full period Pre-crisis 
(bull) 
Post-crisis 
(bear) 
H1 Average forecasts  Market returns Rec. pos (1-2 lags) 0 neg (1-3 lags) 
TP neg (1-3 lags) neg (1-2 lags) neg (1-3 lags) 
H1 Market returns  Average forecasts Rec. neg (1,2 lags) 0 neg (2-8 lags) 
TP neg (2-5 lags) 0 neg (1-2 lags) 
H2 Dispersion of forecasts  Market returns  Rec. pos (1-2 lags) pos (1 lag) 0 
TP neg (1-2 lags) neg (1-3 lags) 0 
H2 Market returns  Dispersion of forecasts  Rec. 0 pos (6-8 lags) pos (4,5 lags) 
TP neg (3-8 lags) 0 neg (2-8 lags) 
H3 Fund flows Market returns n.a. pos (2 lags) neg (1-3 lags) pos (2 lags) 
H3 Market returns  Fund flows n.a. pos (1-4 lags) pos (1-3 lags) pos (1-3 lags) 
H4 Average forecasts  Fund flows Rec. 0 0 0 
TP neg (1 lag) neg (1 lag) 0 
H4 Fund flows  Average forecasts Rec. neg (1-8 lag) neg (1-8 lag) neg (1-5 lag) 
TP neg (7,8 lag) neg (1,5 lag) 0 
H5 Dispersion of forecasts  Fund flows Rec. 0 pos (2-3 lags) 0 
TP 0 0 0 
H5 Fund flows  Dispersion of forecasts  Rec. pos (2,3 lag) 0 pos (2,8 lags) 
TP neg (1-8 lags) 0 0 
Figure 8: Summary of empirical tests for Granger-causality in the market microstructure. 
In summary, the tendency I observed was that increases in market returns were caused by 
fund flow increases, average forecast decreases, and lower dispersion of analyst forecast, 
albeit, the last one is a very weak relationship. From this I conclude that there are some signs 
of temporary inefficiencies, but the efficient market hypothesis cannot be falsified, even in 
these emerging markets. 
Further research areas which were beyond the scope of my dissertation include the impact of 
market liquidity and also examining the impact of analysts based on their past performance 
and their experience. Also, optimising trading algorithms and strategies with accounting for 
transaction costs, and investigating whether contrarian trading strategies yield better results 
can be topics to further explore. 
I presented my results in this dissertation and showed the value of analyst forecast and fund 
flow data in understanding returns through the example of Emerging European equity 
markets. With wider-spread availability of the analyst forecast and fund flow data, I hope 
more academic research would cover the microstructure of the cash equity business, that 
would ultimately benefit investors and capital markets. 
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Glossary 
Consensus 
It is the average forecast of equity analysts covering a stock. 
Consensus may refer to target prices and earnings estimates. 
Coverage 
The act of providing analysis for a stock by issuing research reports 
including target prices and recommendations on a regular basis.  
Developed markets Includes stock markets of USA, Canada, Western Europe, Asia, Japan 
Downgrade (of a 
recommendation) 
When a new recommendation is on a lower grade than the previous 
one. Going from strong buy to buy, buy to neutral and so on. 
Downside 
The negative difference (in %) between the target price and the current 
closing price of the stock. 
Earnings estimate 
Estimation of earnings per share (EPS) for a stock by an analyst for a 
given date. May also be referred to as earnings forecast. 
EMEA Europe, Middle East, Africa 
Emerging markets Includes EMEA, LatAm (Latin America) 
Equity Analyst 
Is the person authorised to cover stocks on behalf of a brokerage firm. 
Their qualification is usually supported by professional exams (e.g. 
CFA) and regulatory approvals (e.g. FSA exam). 
Fair value 
Theoretical economic value based on present value of future cash 
flows. 
Forecast 
In my dissertation, I will collectively refer to target prices and the 
recommendations as analyst forecasts or simply forecasts. 
Maintenance or 
reiteration (of a 
recommendation) 
When a new recommendation is not changed from the previous one. 
Market value Valuation based on stock price, as priced in by the market. 
Opinion Used interchangeably with Analyst forecast. See Forecast. 
Pricing date 
The date on which pricing is carried out for a research note. It is 
usually 1-2 days prior to the publication date, allowing time for final 
editing and production. 
Publication date 
The date on which research notes are published, i.e. dispersed to 
clients and data source providers. 
Recommendation 
Qualitative rating of a stock given on an ordinal scale referring to the 
analysts’ advice to purchase, to hold on to or to dispose of the stock. 
Research note or 
equity research 
The written product of an equity analyst or a team of analysts that 
includes the target price and recommendation on the covered stock, 
and quantitative and qualitative assessment of the investment case.  
Stock universe The whole set of stocks covered by a brokerage firm. 
Target price The fair value of the stock 12 months from now.  
Upside 
The positive difference (in %) between the target price and the current 
closing price of the stock. 
Earnings forecast See earnings estimate 
Upgrade (of a 
recommendation) 
When a new recommendation is on a higher grade than the previous 
one. Going from strong sell to sell, sell to neutral and so on. 
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